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1955 
THE HELICOPTER STATE: MISUSE OF PARENS 
PATRIAE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY PRECLUDES 
INDIVIDUAL AND CLASS CLAIMS 
Gabrielle J. Hanna* 
Abstract: The doctrine of parens patriae allows state attorneys general to represent state 
citizens in aggregate litigation suits that are, in many ways, similar to class actions and mass-
tort actions. Its origins, however, reflect a more modest scope. Parens patriae began as a 
doctrine allowing the British king to protect those without the ability to protect themselves, 
including wards and mentally disabled individuals. The rapid expansion of parens patriae 
standing in the United States may be partly to blame for the relative absence of limiting 
requirements or even well-developed case law governing parens patriae suits. On the one 
hand, class actions are subject to myriad stringent procedural rules that help protect class 
members, members who “opt out,” and even defendants who find themselves liable for often 
sky-high damages. On the other hand, parens patriae suits are largely unregulated and free 
from requirements that plaintiffs seeking class certification must meet. Part of this distinction 
seems to stem from an assumption that attorneys general are adequate representatives of their 
citizens’ interests. The relative ease of bringing a parens patriae suit, compared to the 
increasingly onerous requirements of private class actions, has led state attorneys general to 
bring claims under parens patriae standing more frequently in the twenty-first century. But the 
lack of procedural protections in parens patriae suits means that state citizens affected by a 
parens patriae suit may potentially be precluded via res judicata from bringing valid, 
individual or class claims that have already been brought by the state on their behalf. 
Furthermore, it is not clear that parens patriae suits are an adequate, let alone superior, method 
of litigating citizens’ claims. Settlements reached between states and defendants pose 
additional adequacy problems due to being unregulated and determined by a political 
representative, who may have interests distinct and separate from the interests of individual 
citizens. 
First, this Comment traces the history of parens patriae as a doctrinal theory and as it has 
developed in American statutory and common law. Next, it considers the preclusive effect of 
parens patriae suits on private individual claims and damages class actions. In particular, final 
judgments issued in parens patriae suits have the potential to bar individuals and entire classes 
from bringing valid claims under res judicata. Because parens patriae actions are not subject 
to the same procedural requirements as private class actions, the due process rights of certain 
individuals are, at times, put in jeopardy. In order to protect individual due process rights, this 
Comment suggests four possible solutions: courts should (1) heighten the procedural 
requirements for state aggregate suits, (2) hold that parens patriae suits cannot bind private 
claimants, (3) join related public and private suits, at least for liability litigation to ensure 
private claims are not dismissed unfairly, or (4) allow private citizens with claims, either 
individually or through class representation, to stay a parens patriae action to avoid preclusion. 
                                                     
* J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2018. I would like to thank 
Professor Elizabeth Porter for her guidance, edits, and insight. I would also like to thank the 
exceptional team at Washington Law Review, who made this piece possible. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Parens patriae means “parent of the country,” which “refers 
traditionally to [the] role of [the] state as sovereign and guardian of 
persons under legal disability.”1 In the modern context, state attorneys 
general may invoke parens patriae standing to sue on behalf of their 
state’s citizens. The most powerful and sweeping exercise of parens 
patriae power in U.S. history occurred during the 1990s against the 
tobacco industry.2 While the tobacco litigation had relatively little impact 
on the actual development of parens patriae doctrine, it resuscitated 
parens patriae as a viable and expansive tool capable of resolving mass 
tort suits3 and simultaneously brought an industry to its knees.4 The 
specific context made for an ideal use of parens patriae: injury was 
substantial and widespread, states had a direct sovereign interest that had 
been impacted, and individual citizens were essentially unable to litigate 
against the behemoth tobacco companies.5 And indeed, the success of the 
tobacco litigation was spectacular.6 The scope of cooperation among 
interstate attorneys general was remarkable, the $206 billion settlement 
was unprecedented, and it was the first successful action against an 
otherwise-undefeated litigant.7 To a large extent, the states succeeded as 
                                                     
1. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 600, 600 n.8 (1982) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979)). 
2. See Richard P. Ieyoub & Thomas Eisenberg, State Attorney General Actions, the Tobacco 
Litigation, and the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1859, 1860–61 (2000). 
3. See, e.g., Texas v. Am. Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 956, 971 (E.D. Tex. 1997) (“In the Court’s 
opinion, . . . [parens patriae as] a basis for suit has long been available to the State. . . . In this case, 
the State has simply dusted off a long recognized legal theory and seeks to use it to further the 
purposes of the statutes in question and right the alleged wrongs involved in this matter.”). 
4. Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 1860–61. 
5. Id. 
6. Indeed, many scholars have speculated as to what “the next tobacco” would be. See, e.g., Howard 
M. Erichson, Coattail Class Actions: Reflections on Microsoft, Tobacco, and the Mixing of Public 
and Private Lawyering in Mass Litigation, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 20 (2000) (handguns); Joe 
Nocera, The Next Tobacco?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/ 
04/opinion/nocera-the-next-tobacco.html [https://perma.cc/F4WK-PRRH] (NFL football); Roger 
Parloff, Is Fat the Next Tobacco? For Big Food, the Supersizing of America Is Becoming a Big 
Headache, FORTUNE (Feb. 3, 2003), http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune 
_archive/2003/02/03/336442/index.htm [https://perma.cc/W2LU-RUFF] (fast food); Elizabeth Weil, 
Is Sugar the Next Tobacco?, SALON (Jan. 1, 2013), https://www.salon.com/2013/01/01/ 
is_sugar_the_next_tobacco/ [https://perma.cc/7MA4-C5WA] (sugar). 
7. Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 1860 (citing Richard A. Daynard & Mark Gottlieb, Keys 
to Litigating Against Tobacco Companies, TRIAL, Nov. 1999, at 18 (“noting the unsuccessful efforts 
of plaintiffs in the first forty-five years of tobacco litigation”)); Erin Myers, Note, The Manipulation 
of Public Opinion by the Tobacco Industry: Past, Present, and Future, 2 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 
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a result of the utilization of litigation operating under the doctrine of 
parens patriae.8 
Around the same time, state attorneys general used parens patriae 
power against another large corporate defendant—Exxon Corporation 
(Exxon)—in another massive and complex litigation arising out of the 
Exxon-Valdez oil spill in Alaska.9 While the tobacco litigation had 
highlighted the power and potential breadth of parens patriae, the Exxon-
Valdez litigation revealed a potential drawback to parens patriae suits. In 
1989, Alaskan sport-fishermen and the Alaska Sport Fishing Association 
jointly filed a class action against Exxon, alleging injuries from their loss 
of use and enjoyment of natural resources as a result of the catastrophic 
oil spill.10 The district court dismissed their action two years later on the 
grounds that their claims were precluded by a settlement reached in a 
concurrent parens patriae action brought by the state of Alaska claiming 
natural resource damages.11 In other words, judgment on behalf of the 
State’s public suit ultimately precluded the private litigants from seeking 
individual relief. 
Preclusion is a fundamental common law doctrine of American 
jurisprudence. It promotes repose and efficiency by ensuring that 
individuals cannot re-litigate the same suit or matter endlessly in an 
attempt to obtain a more favorable outcome.12 In particular, the doctrine 
of res judicata, or claim preclusion, helps preserve the stability of judicial 
decisions.13 Still, preclusion rules are ultimately subject to the confines of 
the U.S. Constitution. Preclusion is of particular concern in aggregate 
litigation, where multiple suits are joined or aggregated in a single action, 
because such suits are representative in nature—injured individuals who 
are absent or passive can be potentially bound by a judgment in which 
they had no voice. For individuals to be bound by a judgment of a case to 
                                                     
79, 80 (1998) (noting that plaintiffs previously won only two trials of 813 filed claims against tobacco 
companies, and those two trial victories were reversed on appeal). 
8. Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 1861 (crediting private and government litigants’ successes 
in part to “the paradigmatic shift in attitude towards the [tobacco] industry resulting from the state 
litigation brought by attorneys general”). 
9. See generally Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 1994). 
10. Id. at 771. 
11. Id. 
12. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 18 (AM. LAW INST. 1982) (“When a valid and 
final personal judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff: (1) The plaintiff cannot thereafter 
maintain an action on the original claim or any part thereof . . . .”); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Preclusion 
as to Issues of Law: The Legal System’s Interest, 70 IOWA L. REV. 81, 81 (1984). 
13. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 401 (1981). 
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which they were not parties, due process, under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, requires that their interests be adequately represented. 
While it is not unusual for private claims to be precluded by judgments 
or settlements of aggregate litigation, the most common type of aggregate 
litigation—the private class action—is governed by strict procedural 
requirements to ensure adequacy of representation.14 In many ways, 
parens patriae suits mirror typical damages class actions. But despite their 
similarities, parens patriae suits are largely free from the procedural 
restraints curtailing private class actions. In damages class actions, class 
counsel must, inter alia, demonstrate their superior ability to litigate on 
behalf of the class, provide adequate notification to class members, and 
allow class members to opt out of the class judgment and avoid future 
preclusion.15 While parens patriae suits bear a striking resemblance to 
their private counterparts and can have the same preclusive effect, none 
of these protections are generally required of parens patriae suits.16 Thus, 
when parens patriae judgments preclude private claims, it is not clear that 
parens patriae representation is always constitutionally adequate.17 This 
dilemma raises troublesome due process concerns and suggests a new 
approach is necessary to protect individuals from the unjust preclusionary 
effect of certain parens patriae suits. 
Part I of this Comment explains the defining characteristics of parens 
patriae suits and the requirements for invoking parens patriae standing.18 
In particular, parens patriae suits require that a state adequately 
demonstrates a sovereign or quasi-sovereign interest.19 The lack of clarity 
in what constitutes a quasi-sovereign interest has resulted in a majority of 
courts adopting an expansive view of this category, which includes claims 
that private individuals could bring separately. 
Part II sketches the lengthy and contentious history surrounding parens 
patriae authority.20 Two theories offer explanations for the foundation of 
parens patriae standing in the U.S.21 The somewhat bizarre and confusing 
origins of the doctrine help, in part, to explain some of the current 
murkiness surrounding parens patriae law. Additionally, courts’ 
interpretations of parens patriae since the start of the twenty-first century 
                                                     
14. See infra section III.A. 
15. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
16. See infra section III.B. 
17. See infra section III.C. 
18. See infra section I.A. 
19. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 600–01 (1982). 
20. See infra Part II. 
21. See infra section II.A. 
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have consistently expanded the doctrine’s use to contexts that overlap and 
potentially conflict with private individual interests.22 
Part III describes the procedural requirements governing private class 
actions in comparison to the lack of requirements governing parens 
patriae suits.23 This procedural gap ultimately leaves state citizens 
vulnerable to the final judgments achieved by state attorneys general. This 
results in injured individuals being represented without familiar 
requirements of notice, consent to specific legal representation, or formal 
adequacy of representation.24 The resulting preclusion of private claims 
by parens patriae, therefore, may result in the violation of individuals’ 
due process rights. 
Part IV proposes four potential paths forward for parens patriae.25 
First, implementing class-action style procedural requirements for parens 
patriae suits may ensure that individuals are adequately represented and 
allow for appropriate preclusion. Still, doing so may undermine the very 
purpose and character of parens patriae as a form of public litigation.26 
Second, courts could hold that parens patriae suits cannot preclude 
private claims, remedying due process concerns.27 But such a solution 
poses its own challenges in that it may unfairly allow plaintiffs to recover 
twice for the same claim. Third, courts could require consolidation of 
concurrent parens patriae and private actions.28 This would allow courts 
to more fully consider whether claims are best brought by the state or 
individuals. Finally, courts might permit private parties to stay a 
concurrent parens patriae action if a state claim overlapped a private 
individual claim.29 Although the effect of this option would substantially 
prevent unconstitutional preclusion, the likelihood of its implementation 
is slim. As parens patriae suits undoubtedly become more prevalent, 
courts must delineate the limits of both parens patriae preclusion and, 
more generally, quasi-sovereign interests. 
                                                     
22. See infra section II.B. 
23. See infra Part III. 
24. See infra section III.C. 
25. See infra Part IV. 
26. See infra section IV.A. 
27. See infra section IV.B. 
28. See infra section IV.C. 
29. See infra section IV.D. 
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I. AN OVERVIEW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION: PUBLIC 
PARENS PATRIAE SUITS AND PRIVATE CLASS ACTIONS 
The use of class actions as procedural vehicles for complex and mass 
tort litigation has a long history in Anglo-American jurisprudence.30 
Despite a notable increase in private class actions in the middle of the 
twentieth century, their importance has declined in recent decades.31 The 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,32 Ortiz 
v. Fibreboard Corporation,33 and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes34 
stymied subsequent attempts to bring class actions to aggregate large mass 
tort claims because federal courts have tended to deny class certification.35 
Furthermore, the Court’s 2011 decision in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion36 
validated arbitration provisions containing class action waivers, meaning 
that “most class cases will not survive the impending tsunami of class 
                                                     
30. See The Supreme Court, 1996 Term-Leading Cases, 111 HARV. L. REV. 197, 350 (1997) (citing 
David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice by Collective Means, 62 
IND. L.J. 561, 563 n.9 (1987) (pointing out the notable increase in mass tort claims filed in the last 
few decades)); John D. Aldock & Richard M. Wyner, The Use of Settlement Class Actions to Resolve 
Mass Tort Claims After Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 33 TORT & INS. L.J. 905, 907 (1998) 
(noting the “explosion” of mass tort claims filed against corporate defendants in the last decade). 
31. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of 
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 623 (2012) (describing class actions as being 
“on the ropes” in part because “[c]ourts in recent years have ramped up the standards governing the 
certification of damages classes and created new standing requirements for consumer class actions”); 
Deborah R. Hensler, Goldilocks & the Class Action, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 56, 56 (2012) (noting that 
“[m]ass tort actions have virtually disappeared”); Margaret S. Thomas, Morphing Case Boundaries 
in Multidistrict Litigation Settlements, 63 EMORY L.J. 1339, 1346 & n.37 (2014) (“[A]ttempts to use 
the class action device under Rule 23 to aggregate nationwide mass tort claims to facilitate global 
settlements have been increasingly doomed because federal courts often decline to certify such 
classes.”). 
32. 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
33. 527 U.S. 815 (1999). 
34. 564 U.S. 338 (2011); see also Gilles & Friedman, supra note 31, at 623 (“[I]n Wal-Mart v 
Dukes, the Supreme Court articulated a new and highly restrictive interpretation of the commonality 
requirement of Rule 23(a).”). 
35. See Anne Bloom, From Justice to Global Peace: A (Brief) Genealogy of the Class Action Crisis, 
39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 719, 747 (2006); Jeremy Hays, The Quasi-Class Action Model for Limiting 
Attorneys’ Fees in Multidistrict Litigation, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 589, 601 (2012) (noting the 
waning use of class actions under Rule 23); Samuel Issacharoff, Private Claims, Aggregate Rights, 
2008 SUP. CT. REV. 183, 208 (“As a result, class actions seemed to drop out of the available set of 
tools for attempting to settle most mass torts . . . .”). 
36. 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
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action waivers.”37 In particular, private class actions have in part been 
supplanted by public litigation.38 
This Comment focuses on state litigation seeking financial relief to 
remedy unlawful activities against the state’s citizens.39 State litigation 
finds its authority, on one hand, in state statutes, and on the other hand, in 
the doctrine of parens patriae. Parens patriae actions represent an 
alternative and increasingly popular method of aggregate litigation,40 
particularly in the fields of consumer, antitrust, environmental, and health 
law.41 
A. To Invoke Parens Patriae Standing, States Must Assert a 
Sufficiently Aggregated Sovereign or Quasi-Sovereign Interest 
Today, courts uniformly acknowledge a state’s legal right to sue as 
parens patriae on behalf of its citizens’ interests.42 State attorneys general 
use parens patriae standing to obtain monetary relief and damages for 
their respective states’ citizens. Parens patriae suits nearly always settle 
and can vary wildly in size: 
Such suits run the gamut from multimillion-dollar, multistate 
treble-damages antitrust suits to single-state actions against 
unscrupulous businesses that bilked residents out of a few 
hundred dollars . . . . But attorneys general take pains to publicize 
their litigation successes, and their press releases paint a colorful 
picture of public attorneys going to bat for the “little guy” against 
a variety of bad actors.43 
                                                     
37. Gilles & Friedman, supra note 31, at 623. 
38. See id. (positing that “we would hope to see the ‘private attorney general’ role assumed by class 
action lawyers over the past several decades give way to a world in which state attorneys general 
make unprecedented use of their parens patriae authority”). 
39. Financial relief sought by state litigation is often supplemented by other remedial or 
preventative relief, including injunctions or civil penalties. However, for the purposes of this 
Comment, the analytical lens is primarily focused on state suits seeking financial relief because such 
claims pose preclusion challenges separate from and more egregious than claims seeking injunctive 
relief. 
40. See Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 1859; Jack Ratliff, Parens Patriae: An Overview, 74 
TUL. L. REV. 1847, 1851 (2000). 
41. See Margaret S. Thomas, Parens Patriae and the States’ Historic Police Power, 69 S.M.U. L. 
REV. 759, 764 (2016). 
42. See Nebraska v. Central Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Comm’n, 834 F. Supp. 1205 
(D. Neb. 1993), aff’d, 26 F.3d 77 (8th Cir. 1994); Maine v. M/V Tamano, 357 F. Supp. 1097 (D. Me. 
1973); Maryland Dep’t Nat. Res. v. Amerada Hess Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1060 (D. Md. 1972). 
43. See Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative Suits by State 
Attorneys General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486, 498–500 (2014) (citing In re Compact Disc Minimum 
Advertised Price Antitrust Litig., 216 F.R.D. 197 (D. Me. 2003) (“multistate antitrust action that 
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The leading case discussing parens patriae in the modern context is 
Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico.44 To maintain a parens patriae 
action, the Court in Snapp established that a state must have standing as 
parens patriae in the context of a particular claim.45 In particular, to 
invoke parens patriae standing, a state must: (1) “articulate an interest 
apart from the interests of particular private parties, i.e., the State must be 
more than a nominal party,” and (2) assert an injury to a sovereign or 
quasi-sovereign interest.46 Thus, parens patriae standing requires the state 
itself to have an interest in the claim,47 which can be satisfied if the state 
acts on behalf of “its residents in general”48 as opposed to “particular 
citizens.”49 
A state’s sovereign interests encompass its right to enforce its criminal 
or civil laws, or other state regulatory provisions.50 Courts have struggled 
                                                     
settled for $67.375 million in cash payments and $75.7 million worth of CDs to be distributed to states 
based on population”)); John Mariani, Wedding Photographer Must Complete Work for Old 
Customers Before Taking on New Ones, SYRACUSE (Apr. 29, 2010), http://www.syracuse.com 
/news/index.ssf/2010/04/wedding_photorapher_must_comp.html [https://perma.cc/479U-VCE4] 
(“A local wedding photographer has reached a settlement with the Attorney General’s office spelling 
out how he will make good on his contracts with 33 clients to provide them with wedding pictures, 
albums and DVDs that they paid for but never received. It also orders Harold J. ‘Bud’ Thorpe III to 
pay $4,000 in penalties and costs and at least $500 in restitution.”); OHIO ATT’Y GEN., CONSUMER 
PROTECTION ANNUAL REPORT (2010), http://www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/OhioAttorneyGeneral 
/fies/c2/c205fbde-7328-4fad-a129-6a12f4af0360.pdf [https://perma.cc/F36K-NFRM]; Press Release, 
Iowa Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Att’y Gen., Florida Telemarketer Pays Full Restitution to 227 
Iowans (Dec. 2, 2008), http://www.state.ia.us/government/ag/latest_news/releases/dec_2008/ 
Galaxy_Restitution.html [https://perma.cc/63ML-MB4D] (“describing settlement with telemarketers 
under which $12,824 will be provided to Iowa citizens in restitution”); Press Release, N.Y. State 
Office of the Att’y Gen., Cuomo Secures an Additional $8.5 Million in Settlements with Companies 
that Tricked Consumers into Signing up for Discount Clubs with Hidden Fees (Sept. 21, 2010), 
http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/cuomo-secures-additional-85-million-settlements-companies-
tricked-consumers-signing [https://perma.cc/8YQJ-TKF2]; Press Release, Office of Att’y Gen. Terry 
Goddard, DirecTV to Provide Refunds to Consumers as Part of Deceptive Advertising Settlement 
(Dec. 28, 2010), http://www.azag.gov/press_releases/dec/2010/Press%20Release%20%20-%20DIR 
ECTV.html [https://perma.cc/S87Y-U8M9]. 
44. 458 U.S. 592 (1982); see also Lemos, supra note 43, at 494. 
45. See Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607. 
46. Id.; see also Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 1863–64. 
47. See Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 1882 (“[S]tates cannot be acting simply as 
enforcement agencies for small collections of private individuals. There must be a state interest 
beyond that of private parties to warrant a parens patriae action.”). 
48. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607. 
49. Id. at 600; see also Lemos, supra note 43, at 495 (“In other words, private interests can rise to 
the level of a quasi-sovereign state interest when sufficiently aggregated.”). 
50. See Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 1865 n.27 (citing Snapp, 458 U.S. at 598, 601) (noting 
that the Snapp “Court recognized a second sovereign interest”—”recognition from other sovereigns,” 
and “maintenance and recognition of borders”). 
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to provide a clear and concrete definition of what exactly constitutes 
quasi-sovereign interests.51 In Snapp, the Court emphasized that quasi-
sovereign interests defy “an exhaustive formal definition.”52 The Supreme 
Court in Snapp summarized parens patriae standing as follows: 
In order to maintain [a parens patriae action], the State must 
articulate an interest apart from the interests of particular private 
parties, i.e., the State must be more than a nominal party. The 
State must express a quasi-sovereign interest. Although the 
articulation of such interests is a matter for case-by-case 
development—neither an exhaustive formal definition nor a 
definitive list of qualifying interests can be presented in the 
abstract—certain characteristics of such interests are so far 
evident . . . . First, a State has a quasi-sovereign interest in the 
health and well-being—both physical and economic—of its 
residents in general. Second, a State has a quasi-sovereign interest 
in not being discriminatorily denied its rightful status within the 
federal system.53 
The Court specifically did not attempt “to draw any definitive limits on 
the proportion of the population of the State that must be adversely 
affected by the challenged behavior.”54 As a result, courts have adopted 
an expansive and flexible category of quasi-sovereign interests, consisting 
of a state’s “interest in protecting and vindicating the health, safety, and 
welfare of its people.”55 In contrast, harm to proprietary interests (such as 
business ventures or ownership of land) or private interests (nominal state 
pursuit of private party interests) does not justify parens patriae 
standing.56 
Finally, when evaluating a state’s parens patriae standing, a court may 
consider “whether the injury is one that the State, if it could, would likely 
attempt to address through its sovereign lawmaking powers.”57 A court 
may also consider whether the challenged conduct affects, either directly 
or indirectly, a “sufficiently substantial segment of its population.”58 Even 
                                                     
51. Id. at 1866 (“The Court developed the concept of quasi-sovereign interests through example 
and counterexample rather than through deductive reasoning.”). 
52. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 1864. 
56. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 601–02. 
57. Id. at 607. 
58. Id.; see also Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 592 (1923) (parens patriae action 
brought on behalf of “a substantial portion of the state’s population,” who were denied access to 
natural gas). 
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here, the Court has avoided establishing precisely how many of the state’s 
residents must be affected to constitute sufficient aggregation.59 
B. Parens Patriae Suits Resemble Private Class Actions but Lack 
Similar Procedural Protections 
Private class actions share many similarities with parens patriae suits.60 
Both can be efficient and effective methods of aggregating damages 
claims to obtain compensation for a large number of plaintiffs.61 Class 
actions and parens patriae suits also provide unique opportunities for 
deterrence of unlawful conduct.62 Such conduct is often committed by 
powerful corporations that would otherwise be, in effect, immune from 
such deterrence if claims were not aggregated through class actions or 
parens patriae suits because “[s]uch large cases are thought to be 
necessary to enforce the laws prohibiting a defendant’s wrongful 
behavior, since without aggregation, such claims are too monetarily 
insignificant to warrant individual lawsuits.”63 Both forms of aggregate 
litigation allow for potentially enormous compensatory and punitive 
damages. Furthermore, their aggregation provides representative 
attorneys with adequate compensation in the class action context, and 
provides state attorneys general with sufficient justification to expend 
large quantities of resources in pursuing their claims in the parens patriae 
context. Indeed, both class actions and parens patriae suits are 
representative by nature—individuals have their rights adjudicated 
without having to play a direct role in the case.64 
                                                     
59. It is clear that a state can have parens patriae standing without involving all or even a majority 
of the state’s residents. See Snapp, 458 U.S. at 609 (involving 787 job opportunities for residents of 
Puerto Rico, which had a population of approximately 3 million); Lemos, supra note 43, at 495 n.37. 
60. See Susan Beth Farmer, More Lessons from the Laboratories: Cy Pres Distributions in Parens 
Patriae Antitrust Actions Brought by State Attorneys General, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 361, 362 (1999) 
(describing parens patriae actions as “an efficient alternative to consumer class actions”); Amy J. 
Wildermuth, Why State Standing in Massachusetts v. EPA Matters, 27 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. 
L. 273, 300 (2007) (“[T]he emphasis on harm to a substantial segment of the population suggests that 
this type of [parens patriae] suit is similar to a class action.”). 
61. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., PLEADING AND PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 
639 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 11th ed. 2015) (“A class action allows a large number of related 
claims to be ‘aggregated’ together and resolved in a single case.”); Edward Brunet, Improving Class 
Action Efficiency by Expanded Use of Parens Patriae Suits and Intervention, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1919, 
1922 (2000) (“The nature of these suits is to achieve broad compensation, to deter wrongful conduct 
by one or more defendants, and to focus on injuries to a large set of state citizens.”). 
62. See HAZARD, supra note 61, at 639.  
63. See id. 
64. See Lemos, supra note 43, at 500. 
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Federal courts have regularly allowed parens patriae suits to 
substitute—and take precedence over—private class actions or other 
forms of aggregate litigation for several reasons.65 First, as discussed 
below, parens patriae suits avoid the complex and time-consuming 
procedural requirements applicable to private class actions. Second, some 
courts consider attorneys general to be better able to represent citizens’ 
interests than private counsel.66 Finally, state attorneys general receive a 
much smaller portion of any received compensation, “put[ting] more 
money in the hands of the interested individuals.”67 
                                                     
65. See Kamm v. Cal. City Dev. Co., 509 F.2d 205, 207–08 (9th Cir. 1975); New York v. 
Intercounty Mortgagee Corp., 448 N.Y.S.2d 675, 677 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (holding that the New 
York Attorney General’s action was “a superior and more effective device for obtaining restitution 
than [the pending] class actions” without explanation); 5 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S 
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.46[2][c] [hereinafter MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE] (“[I]f a governmental 
unit has brought suit on the same issue, a court may decide that the proposed private class action is 
unnecessary and an inferior method of adjudication.”); Farmer, supra note 60, at 387–88 (“When 
confronted with the choice, courts generally have respected Congress’s intentions [in federal antitrust 
law], concluding that statutory parens patriae actions brought by the state Attorney General on behalf 
of the natural-persons citizens of the state are superior to class actions brought under Rule 23.” 
(footnote omitted)); Robert L. Hubbard & James Yoon, How the Antitrust Modernization Commission 
Should View State Antitrust Enforcement, 17 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 497, 514 (2005) (“Courts have 
repeatedly recognized the superiority of government actions in a variety of contexts.”). Indeed, the 
state of Maryland has codified the superiority of parens patriae suits over class actions. See MD. 
CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 11-209(c) (West 2005) (“An action brought by the Attorney General as 
parens patriae . . . is presumed superior to any class action brought on behalf of the same person.”). 
66. See, e.g., Lemos, supra note 43, at 506–07 n.84 (citing Thornton v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. 
Co., No. 1:06-cv-00018, 2006 WL 3359482, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 17, 2006) (remarking that 
“[p]roceedings by the state . . . are presumably taken with the best interests of state residents in 
mind”); Sage v. Appalachian Oil Co., Nos. 3:92-CV-176, 2:93-CV-229, 1994 WL 637443, at *1–2 
(E.D. Tenn. Sept. 7, 1994) (“[T]he State, through the Attorney General, is clearly in a superior position 
to bring a parens patriae action . . . on behalf of all natural persons in this state. . . . [T]he State should 
be the preferred representative of a class of all persons, including non-natural persons such as business 
entities . . . .”); Lohse v. Dairy Comm’n of Nev., 25 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1018, 1977 WL 1523, at *7 (D. 
Nev. 1977) (“This kind of state action [was] much preferred to a punitive treble damage antitrust 
private civil remedy the proceeds from which will only slightly benefit any individual plaintiff.”)).  
67. Lemos, supra note 43, at 507 n.85 (citing Thornton, 2006 WL 3359482, at *3 (“[P]otential class 
members will often recover more [from attorney general litigation] than they would in a private action 
when costs and attorneys’ fees are factored in.”); Farmer, supra note 60, at 388 (“In 
some . . . decisions, courts have considered the state Attorney General’s lack of pecuniary interest, 
contradistinguished from consumer class action suits brought by private counsel, to be a relevant 
factor in choosing the parens patriae action over class actions.” (footnote omitted)); Stephen B. 
Malech & Robert E. Koosa, Government Action and the Superiority Requirement: A Potential Bar to 
Private Class Action Lawsuits, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1419, 1422 (2005) (“[T]he vast majority of 
courts holding that private class actions are not superior to Government Action have apparently done 
so, in part, simply because of deference to the government and/or a belief that [government] 
lawsuits . . . provided private plaintiffs with a more economical and manageable method of obtaining 
relief than a class action lawsuit.”)). 
10 - Hanna.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/18/2017  9:06 AM 
1966 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:1955 
 
In other circumstances, private class actions and parens patriae suits 
“proceed in tandem, with public and private attorneys working together to 
seek common remedies.”68 In these situations and those involving 
complex tort litigation with dozens of class actions, individual suits, and 
parens patriae claims, problems with the application of preclusion can 
occasionally arise. In particular, parens patriae claims based on quasi-
sovereign interests are particularly prone to issues of preclusion. This 
preclusion problem happens when a state has a quasi-sovereign interest in 
a particular claim that overlaps with a private individual’s or classes’ 
interest in the same claim.69 
In general, judgment for a parens patriae state suit is binding “on every 
person whom the state represents as parens patriae,”70 which invariably 
includes the respective state’s citizens. In this sense, parens patriae suits 
are similar to private class actions in that they represent—and bind—
absent individuals. This rationale rests on two fundamental principles of 
preclusion law wherein plaintiffs should not be entitled to “multiple bites 
at the apple”71 and defendants should not be subjected to a sort of double 
jeopardy.72 Thus, if a party’s interests are ultimately advanced by the state 
in its parens patriae suit, then that citizen is a “‘part[y]’ to the . . . suit 
within the meaning of res judicata”73 and is barred from bringing a private 
individual or class action on the same interests. 
                                                     
68. Lemos, supra note 43, at 499 (citing ROBERT L. HUBBARD, THE ANTITRUST PLAINTIFF’S 
PERSPECTIVE: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT IN COMPLEX LITIGATION — STATE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL PERSPECTIVE 9 (2002)) (“Not every state attorney general joins every litigation. Usually 
class counsel will assert claims on behalf of the residents in states not represented by an attorney 
general.”); see also In re Minolta Camera Prods. Antitrust Litig., 668 F. Supp. 456, 460 (D. Md. 
1987). 
69. See Lemos, supra note 43, at 532–35. 
70. Farmer, supra note 60, at 384; see also Satsky v. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc., 7 F.3d 1464, 
1470 (10th Cir. 1993) (“When a state litigates common public rights, the citizens of that state are 
represented in such litigation by the state and are bound by the judgment.”); Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp. v. Gault, 627 S.E.2d 549 (Ga. 2006) (concluding that a punitive damages claim filed 
by decedent’s estate against tobacco companies was barred by the master settlement between the 
tobacco companies and the state acting as parens patriae); Bonovich v. Convenient Food Mart, Inc., 
310 N.E.2d 710, 711 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974) (holding that defeat of an antitrust suit brought by the 
Attorney General via parens patriae barred a similar action by a private party because “the Attorney 
General’s action . . . was brought on behalf of all the people in the state . . . who were adversely 
affected by the alleged antitrust violations”); Fabiano v. Philip Morris Inc., 862 N.Y.S.2d 487 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2008) (similar holding as Brown & Williamson, 627 S.E.2d 549). 
71. Lemos, supra note 43, at 500. 
72. Id. at 546–48; Edward W. Cleary, Res Judicata Reexamined, 57 YALE L. J. 339, 344 (1948). 
73. Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 773 (9th Cir. 1994) (“State 
governments may act in their parens patriae capacity as representatives for all their citizens in a suit 
to recover damages for injury to a sovereign interest. . . . There is a presumption that the state will 
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However, while class actions are restricted by procedural requirements 
that ensure absent members are adequately represented or can opt out, 
preventing preclusion, parens patriae suits are largely free from such 
protections.74 As a result, individuals may be bound by the judgment of a 
parens patriae suit without having the opportunity to opt out or even 
receive notice, and without any inquiry into whether their interests are 
being adequately represented.75 Furthermore, individuals precluded by 
parens patriae suits have no say in how damages obtained by a parens 
patriae judgment or settlement are disbursed. 
Nonetheless, courts generally permit states to bring parens patriae 
claims even when the state’s interest overlaps with an individual interest.76 
The decision in Snapp supports this majority approach that state parens 
patriae claims may be premised on injuries to citizens for which those 
citizens could individually sue.77 The important distinction between this 
type of quasi-sovereign interest and a private interest—which cannot 
support parens patriae standing—is that damages must be sufficiently 
aggregated. In other words, the state interest must be on behalf of 
“residents in general” and not just “particular individuals.”78 In order to 
qualify, the injury must affect a “sufficiently substantial segment of [a 
state’s] population.”79 Still, a minority of courts have interpreted Snapp 
“to preclude states from using parens patriae authority to pursue damages 
that could be recovered through private litigation, on the view that the 
state in such cases is not the real party in interest.”80 Regardless, most 
parens patriae cases have another form of authority explicitly allowing 
                                                     
adequately represent the position of its citizens. . . . Thus, the sportfishers here, as members of the 
public, were ‘parties’ to the . . . suit within the meaning of res judicata.”). 
74. See Lemos, supra note 43, at 500–10. 
75. Id. 
76. See id. at 494. 
77. See id.; Wildermuth, supra note 60, at 300 (explaining that Snapp “says nothing about limiting 
quasi-sovereign interest suits” to “those instances in which it would be unlikely for individuals to 
bring their own suits”). 
78. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607, 608 n.14 (1982). 
79. Id. at 607. Thus, the injured population does not need to constitute the entirety of a state’s 
residents. 
80. Lemos, supra note 43, at 494 (citing New York v. 11 Cornwell Co., 695 F.2d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 
1982) (“Parens patriae standing also requires a finding that individuals could not obtain complete 
relief through a private suit.”), vacated on other grounds, 718 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1983) (en banc); 
Pennsylvania v. Nat’l Ass’n of Flood Insurers, 520 F.2d 11, 23 (3d Cir. 1975) (suggesting that a state 
cannot establish standing as parens patriae in situations where citizens can pursue private actions), 
overruled by Pennsylvania v. Porter, 659 F.2d 306, 317–18, 317 nn.15–16 (3d Cir. 1981) 
(disapproving the relevant portions of Nat’l Ass’n of Flood Insurers)). 
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state attorneys general to sue on behalf of the state’s citizens—namely, 
state81 or federal statutes.82 
II. THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF PARENS PATRIAE 
AUTHORITY 
Although contemporary class actions have their justificatory roots at 
least somewhat settled in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,83 the 
historical origins of parens patriae are less clear and more contentious.84 
Tracing and understanding the heritage of parens patriae is important for 
several reasons. First, the original use and purpose of parens patriae 
power in fourteenth century England85 and its early adoption in federalist 
American law86 were critical in shaping the doctrine and supplying it with 
its defining characteristics. Second, courts have struggled to articulate the 
scope and bounds of when a state has authority to sue on behalf of its 
citizens under parens patriae in large part due to the confusion and 
“murkiness” surrounding the source and history of the doctrine.87 Finally, 
a grasp on the history of parens patriae is useful, perhaps even necessary, 
to frame a more defined scope of parens patriae actions that capitalizes 
on their efficiency and effectiveness, while avoiding occasional conflicts 
of interest or violations of due process. 
                                                     
81. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.577(b) (2017 1st Reg. Sess.); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-75-212 
(West 2016); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16760 (West 2008); COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-4-111 (2011); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 35-32 (2016); DEL. CODE tit. 6, § 2108 (2016); FLA. STAT. § 542.22 (West 2007); 
HAW. REV. STAT. § 480-14 (2016); IDAHO CODE § 48-108 (2016); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.080 
(2016) (authorizing parens patriae actions for restitution on behalf of Washington victims of 
consumer protection violations).  
82. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 15c (2006) (authorizing suit for violations of federal antitrust law); 15 
U.S.C. § 1679h(c)(1) (2006) (authorizing suit for violations of federal law governing credit repair 
organizations); 15 U.S.C. § 1681s(c) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (credit reporting agencies); 15 U.S.C. 
§ 5712 (2006) (pay-per-call services); 15 U.S.C. § 6103 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (telemarketers); 15 
U.S.C. § 6309(c) (2006) (professional boxing matches); 15 U.S.C. § 6504 (2006) (children’s online 
privacy protection); 15 U.S.C. § 7706(f) (2006) (email spam); 15 U.S.C. § 7804 (2006) (sports 
agents). 
83. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
84. See Thomas, supra note 41, at 759 (noting the “vague and ill-defined” source of the power to 
sue under parens patriae). 
85. See Lawrence B. Custer, The Origins of the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 27 EMORY L.J. 195, 
195 (1978). 
86. Thomas, supra note 41, at 764–65. 
87. Id. 
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A. The Murky Origins of Parens Patriae Authority 
The concept of “group litigation” has existed since medieval times in 
English common law. While class actions originated in the U.S. and are 
still predominantly an American phenomenon, the doctrine of parens 
patriae has unusual and somewhat contested beginnings. The most 
popular theory postulates that, following the American Revolution, states 
“inherited” the prerogative of the British king to act as “guardian of the 
realm,” a prerogative that became the foundation for contemporary parens 
patriae power.88 This “sovereignty transference” theory89 seems to be the 
most accepted account of how parens patriae power developed in the 
United States, although it is not without critique.90 The “Universal 
Sovereignty” theory suggests that parens patriae power reflects an idea 
of inherent sovereignty characteristic of universal governance.91 The two 
distinct theories further reflect the murkiness behind the origins of parens 
patriae in American jurisprudence, and may explain why courts have been 
hesitant to formally define the doctrine. 
1. “Sovereignty Transference” Theory 
Many legal scholars trace the doctrine of parens patriae “to the role of 
the English Crown as a guardian of realm.”92 In 1324, the British 
Parliament passed the Statute Prerogativa Regis, which formally 
recognized the king’s governors’ power to claim wardship over “all 
natural fools and idiots.”93 In 1567, Sir William Staunford, an English 
jurist and judge, wrote: 
The king is the protectour of all hys subiectes and of all theire 
goods, landes and tenements, and therefore of suche as cannot 
gouerne them selues nor order their lands and tenements his grace 
                                                     
88. Id. at 769–70; JAY L. HIMES, STATE PARENS PATRIAE AUTHORITY: THE EVOLUTION OF THE 
STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S AUTHORITY 1–2 (2004); see generally Custer, supra note 85. 
89. I adopted this label from Thomas, supra note 41, at 769. 
90. See, e.g., id. at 769–73 (pointing out that “the robust English royal prerogatives that were a 
feature of the Stuart Kings’ absolutist designs were already waning in England more than a century 
before the Framing” and that “the lack of a robust royal prerogative to supervise charities at the time 
of the Framing undermines a core premise of the Sovereignty Transference theory of parens patriae 
power”). 
91. See id. at 769. 
92. Id.; see also George B. Curtis, The Checkered Career of Parens Patriae: The State as Parent 
or Tyrant?, 25 DEPAUL L. REV. 895, 896 (1976); Ratliff, supra note 40, at 1850. 
93. See Custer, supra note 85, at 195 (citing H. E. BELL, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY AND 
RECORDS OF THE COURT OF WARDS & LIVERIES 128 (1953)). 
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(as a father) must take vppon him to prouyde for them, that they 
them selues and their things may bee preserued.94 
Here, the king is referred to directly as the parent of his subjects, which 
may be where the name “parens patriae,” or “parent of the country,” 
originated.95 In 1610, King James I addressed himself as “Parens patriae, 
the political father of his people” to Parliament.96 The basis for this power 
is essentially protective97—the guardian-king has a duty to care for his 
subjects, and this duty becomes a legal power over those who are legally 
unable to care for themselves.98 
It is not entirely clear how this distinctly British authority made its way 
into American jurisprudence, although it seems to have entered through 
the channels of common law.99 The earliest American court cases to 
address parens patriae only considered the prerogative of supervising 
charities.100 In 1819 the Supreme Court recognized the royal lineage of 
parens patriae in Trustees of Philadelphia Baptist Association v. Hart’s 
Executors.101 Importantly, Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Baptist 
Association designated state attorneys general as the proper parties to 
wield parens patriae power—a designation that remains true today.102 
The Court quoted a passage from Blackstone’s treatise, Commentaries on 
the Laws of England, which described the king as “the general guardian 
of all infants, idiots, lunatics; and has the general superintendance of all 
charitable uses in the kingdom; and all this over and above the vast and 
extensive jurisdiction which he exercises in his judicial capacity in the 
Court of Chancery.”103 
                                                     
94. STAUNFORD, supra note 93, at 37 (referring to ANTHONY FITZHERBERT, NATURA BREVIUM 
(n.p. 1553) as his authority); see also Custer, supra note 85, at 200–01. 
95. See Custer, supra note 85, at 201. 
96. Id. (italics in original) (citing PAUL L. HUGHES & ROBERT F. FRIES, CROWN AND PARLIAMENT 
IN TUDOR-STUART ENGLAND 167 (1959)). 
97. See id. at 196; BELL, supra note 93, at 127–32. 
98. See Thomas, supra note 41, at 769–70. This included children and persons with mental 
infirmities, as well as charitable trusts. Curtis, supra note 92, at 896 & n.5. 
99. See HIMES, supra note 88, at 1–2. 
100. See Thomas, supra note 41, at 771. 
101. 17 U.S. 1 (1819). 
102. Id. at 50; see also Thomas, supra note 41, at 778 (“As an initial matter, the [Baptist Ass’n] 
opinion identified the state attorney general as the proper party to take up any residual parens patriae 
power. It observed that the practice of the attorney general filing an information ‘might very well 
grow out of [the royal] prerogative’ to supervise charitable uses.” (citations omitted)). 
103. Trs. of Phila. Baptist Ass’n, 17 U.S. at 47 (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *47). 
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However, the Supreme Court overruled Baptist Ass’n in 1853.104 
Justice Story’s opinion in Vidal v. Girard’s Executors105 claimed that 
American parens patriae power was founded in English common law 
alone, ultimately “plant[ing] the seed for current confusion over the 
source of the parens patriae power.”106 In 1972, the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed parens patriae’s sovereign roots and stated simply that the 
English King’s “royal prerogative” and accompanying parens patriae 
power “passed to the States” during the American Revolution.107 
2. “Universal Sovereignty” Theory 
Another less popular theory explaining parens patriae authority 
originates from universal principles of sovereignty and what it means to 
be a functioning government. The first suggestion of this “universal 
sovereignty” theory can be found in the Court’s 1890 opinion in Late 
Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United 
States.108 The Supreme Court invoked parens patriae doctrine under 
“those principles of reason and public policy which prevail in all civilized 
and enlightened communities.”109 Further still, the Court explained that 
the power to regulate and oversee charities via parens patriae “prevail[ed] 
in all civilized countries pervaded by the spirit of Christianity,” with its 
roots in Roman law.110 According to this theory, parens patriae is an 
“ordinary power”—an inherent right of any “government, or sovereign, 
as parens patriae.”111 The universal sovereignty theory attributes parens 
patriae power to the mere existence of government, be it the state, “a royal 
                                                     
104. Vidal v. Girard’s Ex’rs, 43 U.S. 127 (1853). 
105. Id.  
106. See Thomas, supra note 41, at 779–80 (citing Vidal, 43 U.S. at 192–95). 
107. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972); see also Thomas, supra note 41, at 770 
(noting that the Standard Oil Court “makes this sweeping historical conclusion without citing any 
sources or even offering arguments in support of the claim”). 
108. 136 U.S. 1 (1890). This case involved a dispute over land owned by the Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-Day Saints, which had been seized by the U.S. to enforce a federal polygamy statute. Id. at 
8–9. Interestingly, the Court made no distinction between this case and earlier parens patriae cases 
even though all earlier cases dealt exclusively with state parens patriae power while this case 
involved federal parens patriae power. See Thomas, supra note 41, at 783–85. Still, the federal 
general law was eventually deemed unconstitutional in 1938 in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 
(1938), which returned general law (including the general law of charities) to the states.  
109. Latter-Day Saints, 136 U.S. at 51; see also Thomas, supra note 41, at 783. 
110. Latter-Day Saints, 136 U.S. at 51; see also Thomas, supra note 41, at 783–84. 
111. Latter-Day Saints, 136 U.S. at 56. 
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person[,] or . . . the legislature.”112 As recently as 1982, the Court cited the 
rationale of Latter-Day Saints approvingly in Snapp.113 
The rationale of the universal sovereignty theory in Latter-Day Saints 
led to a broader interpretation and more flexible perspective of parens 
patriae power. Indeed, in 1900, just a decade after Latter-Day Saints, the 
state of Louisiana sued as parens patriae to enjoin an embargo, imposed 
by the state of Texas on Louisiana to prevent the spread of yellow fever.114 
The Court ultimately declined to extend its jurisdiction because it 
“interpreted [Louisiana’s] cause of action to be an assertion that the state 
was empowered to seek relief on behalf of its citizens, rather than a cause 
of action asserting a special injury to the state itself.”115 Injury to a state’s 
citizens was not, in itself, sufficient to invoke the Court’s original 
jurisdiction.116 Even so, the case was significant in that it implicitly 
recognized a state’s quasi-sovereign interest in disputes affecting its 
citizens and expanded the potential application of parens patriae authority 
beyond purely sovereign interests.117 
B. Parens Patriae Authority Expanded Rapidly in American Common 
Law Throughout the Twentieth Century 
Although parens patriae authority within the U.S. originated as a very 
limited doctrine of standing for the supervision of charities,118 the first half 
of the twentieth century saw a rapid expansion of the doctrine toward “all-
purpose guardianship power.”119 This new and broader conception of 
parens patriae extended beyond limited classes of vulnerable citizens—
hitherto the extent of the royal prerogative—to a state’s entire citizenry. 
The Court’s implication in Louisiana v. Texas120 that parens patriae 
standing extended over quasi-sovereign interests opened the door for 
parens patriae actions to permeate a multitude of legal spheres.121 
For the twenty-five years following the Court’s decision in Louisiana 
v. Texas, state parens patriae suits claimed authority over injuries caused 
                                                     
112. Id. at 57. 
113. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 600 (1982). 
114. Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1 (1900). 
115. Thomas, supra note 41, at 786–87 (citing Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. at 19). 
116. Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. at 22. 
117. See Thomas, supra note 41, at 787; Ratliff, supra note 40, at 1851. 
118. See Thomas, supra note 41, at 786. 
119. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
120. Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1 (1900). 
121. See id. at 786–88. 
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by environmental torts.122 In Missouri v. Illinois123 the Court recognized 
the state as the “proper party” to represent its citizens through parens 
patriae when their health and welfare are threatened.124 The Court relied 
on a pseudo-universal sovereignty theory wherein states took the place of 
sovereign nations with power to invoke parens patriae.125 In Georgia v. 
Tennessee Copper Company,126 Justice Holmes held that Georgia’s quasi-
sovereign interest extended to “all the earth and air within its domain. It 
has the last word as to whether its mountains shall be stripped of their 
forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air.”127 
Next, the Court extended parens patriae’s reach to injuries based upon 
economic torts, including antitrust and price-fixing claims.128 More 
recently, parens patriae suits have exploded into mass tort and consumer 
protection litigation.129 In the modern context, parens patriae has firmly 
developed beyond the confines of a royal prerogative or derivative 
universal power and has adopted a distinctly American flavor: expansive, 
flexible, and powerful. 
The lack of clarity surrounding the history and source of parens patriae 
authority has “confounded courts attempting to distinguish permissible 
state interests from impermissible citizen interests,” which helps explain 
why courts have been reluctant to create clear boundaries for quasi-
sovereign interests.130 In turn, the absence of a full-fledged common law 
analysis of the concept of quasi-sovereign interests in regards to parens 
patriae suits leaves questions of preclusion and due process unanswered. 
                                                     
122. See, e.g., North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923) (drainage of waterways); 
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923) (natural gas); New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 
296 (1921) (discharge of sewage into public waters); Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 
(1907) (air pollution from an industrial plant); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907) (diverting 
stream water); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901) (pollution of the Mississippi River). 
123. 180 U.S. 208 (1901). 
124. Id. at 241; see also Thomas, supra note 41, at 789. 
125. Thomas, supra note 41, 789–90. 
126. 206 U.S. 230 (1907). 
127. Id. at 237; see also Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 1867. 
128. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 255 (1972); Georgia v. Penn. R.R., 324 U.S. 
439, 451 (1945) (holding that the defendant railroad’s price-fixing conspiracy in violation of federal 
antitrust laws “limits the opportunities of [the state’s] people, shackles her industries, retards her 
development, and relegates her to an inferior economic position among her sister States”); Thomas, 
supra note 41, at 791–93. 
129. See, e.g., Nevada v. Bank of Am. Co., 672 F.3d 661 (9th Cir. 2012) (consumer fraud); In re 
Gen. Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litig., 69 F. Supp. 3d 404 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (vehicle ignition 
defects); In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig., 148 F. Supp. 
3d 1367 (J.P.M.L. 2015) (vehicle emissions litigation); Farmer, supra note 60, at 362–64. 
130. Thomas, supra note 41, at 794. 
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The answers may very well depend on an understanding of the original 
purpose of parens patriae as a doctrine of standing utilized to protect 
citizens who are truly unable to protect themselves. 
III. PARENS PATRIAE PRECLUSION MAY INFRINGE UPON 
INDIVIDUALS’ DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO ADEQUATE 
REPRESENTATION 
A notable distinction between parens patriae suits and private class 
actions is that class actions are subjected to extensive procedural 
safeguards to ensure that the interests of class members are protected and 
that members are adequately represented. Procedural requirements 
governing private class actions seem to reflect an anxiety that the 
increased efficiency of aggregation conflicts with the long-held ethic “that 
one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is 
not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by 
service of process.”131 Furthermore, when courts aggregate claims, they 
can pose a threat to “traditional notions of affirmative client consent—
consent to be represented by a particular attorney, and consent to any 
settlement that the attorney negotiates.”132 
A. Class Actions Are Subject to Stringent Procedural Requirements 
Under Rule 23 
Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows class 
certification only if four requirements are met: numerosity, commonality, 
typicality, and adequacy of representation.133 The first requirement, 
numerosity, ensures that there is a sufficiently large number of related 
                                                     
131. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940); see also Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989) 
(discussing the “deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court” 
(quoting 18A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4449 (2d ed. 2002))); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 
395 U.S. 100, 110 (1969); Lemos, supra note 43, at 501. 
132. Lemos, supra note 43, at 501 (citing Samuel Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 805, 805) (“Nowhere else [but in class action] do we find so clear a departure from 
the premise that the attorney-client relationship is achieved through contractual voluntarism, with the 
terms of the engagement constrained only by the rules of professional conduct.”); Geoffrey P. Miller, 
Conflicts of Interest in Class Action Litigation: An Inquiry into the Appropriate Standard, 2003 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 581, 586 (“[T]he safety valve of client consent is missing, either to authorize the 
representation of multiple plaintiffs or to justify the settlement.”). 
133. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). This Comment does not purport to discuss in detail the federal 
procedural requirements of class actions, but rather provides a cursory outline in which to 
contextualize the lack of procedural requirements for parens patriae suits. 
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claims and plaintiffs to warrant the aggregation of such claims.134 The 
remaining three requirements are designed to guarantee that the 
representative parties share common interests with absent class members, 
and that those interests will be vigorously represented.135 Damages class 
actions are subject to an even higher threshold.136 Rule 23(b)(3) requires 
that “questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over 
any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action 
is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently 
adjudicating the controversy.”137 
Class actions are also subject to a further requirement that they provide 
class members “the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances, 
including individual notice to all members who can be identified through 
reasonable effort.”138 This requirement ensures not only that represented 
parties are made aware of their representation and are provided with an 
opportunity to be heard, but it also gives them the right to opt out of the 
class action.139 Importantly, persons with injuries that qualify them for 
class representation, but who would prefer, for a variety reasons, to seek 
individual relief can choose to opt out and not be bound by the class 
judgment.140 In doing so, they “escape the preclusive effect of the 
aggregate judgment.”141 
B. Parens Patriae Suits Are Largely Free from Procedural 
Requirements and State Attorneys General Are Assumed to 
Constitute Adequate Representation 
These procedural requirements are largely, though not entirely, absent 
from parens patriae actions. To an extent, parens patriae actions satisfy 
a hypothetical numerosity requirement by virtue of their representing a 
                                                     
134. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1). 
135. See Lemos, supra note 43, at 501 (citing Jay Tidmarsh, The Story of Hansberry: The Rise of 
the Modern Class Action, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 233, 287–88 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2d ed. 
2008) (describing functions of Rule 23(a) requirements)). 
136. See David Marcus, Flawed but Noble: Desegregation Litigation and Its Implications for the 
Modern Class Action, 63 FLA. L. REV. 657, 662–70 (2011). 
137. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
138. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B). 
139. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v) (“[T]he court will exclude from the class any member who 
requests exclusion.”). 
140. See Lemos, supra note 43, at 507. 
141. Id. 
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“sufficiently substantial segment” of the state’s population.142 
Additionally, commonality is effectively ensured in that the state must 
allege an injury to the citizens it represents, thereby alleging issues or 
questions common to the group.143 But the requirement of typicality is 
somewhat at odds with the basis of parens patriae authority because the 
state “may not be asserting a claim that can be analogized to a private 
plaintiff’s claim”; the state as representative party “need not assert that it 
has suffered . . . damages, but may simply claim an interest in remedying 
the . . . injury suffered by its citizens.”144 While some statutes authorizing 
parens patriae actions include provisions for notice,145 other parens 
patriae statutes146 and “all state statutes authorizing attorneys general to 
seek restitution for injured citizens . . . omit any requirement of notice.”147 
Perhaps most significantly for this Comment, courts do not inquire into 
the adequacy of representation in public aggregate litigation.148 Thus, 
whereas class actions undergo rigorous scrutiny to ensure fair and 
adequate protection of class interests under Rule 23(a)149 by representative 
parties and under Rule 23(g)150 by class counsel, parens patriae suits are 
largely devoid of such “loyalty” requirements. It seems that the public 
quality of parens patriae has exempted it from such concerns about 
representation.151 In general, courts presume that attorneys general will 
                                                     
142. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982). It should be noted that 
actions under state consumer protection statutes often involve a small number of injured citizens. See 
Lemos, supra note 43, at 502 n.63 (citing Press Release, N.Y. State Office of the Att’y Gen., Attorney 
General Cuomo Secures More Than $100k for Victims of Geneva Car Dealership that Engaged in 
Fraud (June 22, 2010), http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/attorney-general-cuomo-secures-more-
100k-victims-geneva-car-dealership-engaged-fraud [https://perma.cc/EWZ2-BN4Q] (judgment of 
more than $100,000 against car dealership for defrauding thirty-eight customers)). 
143. See Lemos, supra note 43, at 502. 
144. See id.; cf. Farmer, supra note 60, at 381. 
145. See, e.g., Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a)–
(b) (2006); ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.577(e) (2011); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16760(b)(1) (West 
2008); OR. REV. STAT. § 646.775(2)(a) (2011).  
146. See, e.g., Illinois Antitrust Act § 7(2), 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 10/7.2 (2010); NEB. REV. STAT. 
§ 84-212 (2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 356:4-a (2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.07 (West 
2012). 
147. Lemos, supra note 43, at 508. 
148. See id. at 503. 
149. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
150. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g). 
151. See, e.g., Troncelliti v. Minolta Corp., 666 F. Supp. 750, 754 (D. Md. 1987) (“The Court 
cannot overlook the governmental nature of the parens patriae suits, which resulted in the initial 
settlement, where the primary concern of the attorney generals was the protection of and 
compensation for the states’ resident consumers, rather than insuring a fee for themselves . . . .”). 
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diligently represent their citizens’ interests.152 Ultimately, courts do not 
scrutinize parens patriae actions for any Rule 23(a) requirements, nor are 
they required to do so.153 This general presumption that state attorneys 
general diligently represent the interests of their states’ citizenries has 
resulted in a remarkably unregulated form of public aggregate 
litigation.154 Thus, the stringent procedural rules governing private class 
actions are almost entirely absent from parens patriae suits, and a state’s 
injured citizens must rely wholly on the competency and goodwill of their 
elected parens patriae. 
Additionally, parens patriae suits are not subject to the standard class 
action requirement that any proposed settlement be “fair, reasonable, and 
adequate.”155 Such assessment provides a second layer of scrutiny that 
further encourages thorough and attentive representation. While some 
statutes have adopted similar settlement approvals,156 “the primary 
concern of the Attorneys General is the protection of and compensation 
for the States’ resident consumers, rather than insuring [sic] a fee for 
themselves.”157 Challenging the adequacy of representation in a parens 
patriae suit is no easy task—the attorney general must be shown to be “ill-
equipped or unwilling to protect” the citizens’ interests,158 or to have 
committed “misfeasance or nonfeasance in protecting the public” as the 
state’s parens patriae.159 Barring this, state citizens whose interests are 
represented by the parens patriae have no opportunity to be heard.160 
                                                     
152. See, e.g., In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig., 55 F.R.D. 269, 274 (D.D.C. 1972) (“[T]he states 
and cities, acting through their attorneys general . . . are the best representatives of the consumers 
residing within their jurisdictions.”); In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 278, 280 
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) (“[I]t is difficult to imagine a better representative of the retail consumers within a 
state than the state’s attorney general.”). 
153. See generally Lemos, supra note 43. 
154. See id. at 508–10. 
155. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). 
156. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 15c(c) (2006); ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.577(g) (2011); CAL. BUS. PROF. 
CODE § 16760(c) (West 2008); COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-4-111(3)(b) (2011); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 542.22(3)(c) (West 2007); OR. REV. STAT. § 646.775(3) (2011). 
157. In re Minolta Camera Prods. Antitrust Litig., 668 F. Supp. 456, 460 (D. Md. 1987) (applying 
15 U.S.C. § 15c(c)); see also New York v. Reebok Int’l Ltd., 96 F.3d 44, 48 (2d Cir. 1996) (observing 
that attorneys general are motivated by a concern for enforcement of the law); In re Toys ‘R’ Us 
Antitrust Litig., 191 F.R.D. 347, 351 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (“[T]he participation of the State Attorneys 
General furnishes extra assurance that consumers’ interests are protected.”). 
158. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 690 F.2d 1203, 1213 (5th Cir. 
1982). 
159. Chiglo v. City of Preston, 104 F.3d 185, 188 (8th Cir. 1997). 
160. See Lemos, supra note 43, at 510. 
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C. Parens Patriae Preclusion of Private Claims May Violate Due 
Process 
The lack of procedural regulation of parens patriae suits is particularly 
disturbing when considered in light of their preclusive effect on private 
individual or aggregate litigation. While there is little case law 
highlighting parens patriae preclusion,161 courts have generally agreed 
that judgments of public suits preclude private actions bringing the same 
claims.162 Any accompanying due process concerns have received 
surprisingly little attention from courts or scholars.163 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides 
individuals the right to receive notice and the opportunity to be heard 
before a state can deprive them of their property interests.164 Notably, “a 
cause of action is a species of property protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.”165 Accordingly, an individual who is 
not party to a suit generally cannot be bound by its judgment.166 Only 
when representative parties have the same interests and adequately 
represent the absent party’s interests can the absent party be bound by 
such judgment under res judicata.167 Both class actions and parens patriae 
suits have the potential to preclude subsequent actions by private parties. 
The Alaska Sport Fishing case provides a clear example of parens 
patriae preclusion and hints at potential due process violations. In 1989, 
                                                     
161. See id. at 531 (“Case law on parens patriae preclusion is remarkably thin, but the consensus 
view seems to be that public suits preclude all private actions raising the same claims.”). 
162. See Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 773 (9th Cir. 1994); Satsky v. 
Paramount Commc’ns, Inc., 7 F.3d 1464, 1470 (10th Cir. 1993) (“When a state litigates common 
public rights, the citizens of that state are represented in such litigation by the state and are bound by 
the judgment.”); United States v. Olin Corp., 606 F. Supp. 1301, 1303, 1307–08 (N.D. Ala. 1985); 
Menzel v. Cty. Utils. Corp., 501 F. Supp. 354, 357 (E.D. Va. 1979); Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp. v. Gault, 627 S.E.2d 549 (Ga. 2006) (barring a punitive damages claim on decedent’s behalf 
based on the settlement between tobacco companies and the states’ attorneys general acting as parens 
patriae); Bonovich v. Convenient Food Mart, Inc., 310 N.E.2d 710, 711 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974) (holding 
that defeat of a parens patriae antitrust suit barred a similar private individual claim because “the 
Attorney General’s action . . . was brought on behalf of all the people in the state . . . who were 
adversely affected by the alleged antitrust violations”); Fabiano v. Philip Morris Inc., 862 N.Y.S.2d 
487 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008). 
163. See Lemos, supra note 43, at 489–90. 
164. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (“[A]t a minimum 
[the Due Process Clause] require[s] that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be 
preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.”). 
165. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982). 
166. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940) (“It is a principle of general application in 
Anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in 
which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of process.”). 
167. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008). 
10 - Hanna.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/18/2017  9:06 AM 
2017] MISUSE OF PARENS PATRIAE  1979 
 
four Alaskan sport fishermen and the Alaskan Sportfishing Association 
filed a class action against Exxon for damages from loss of use and 
enjoyment of natural resources resulting from the Exxon Valdez oil 
spill.168 The plaintiffs sought injunctive and monetary relief “to provide 
for an environmental mitigation and monitoring fund.”169 Two years later, 
in March 1991, the state of Alaska joined in on the Exxon Valdez 
litigation fray.170 Wielding his power as parens patriae, the Alaska 
attorney general brought suit on behalf of the state’s citizens seeking 
damages for restoration of the environment, and loss of public use of 
natural resources.171 A mere six months later, Alaska and the United States 
government entered into a court-approved settlement agreement and 
consent decree with Exxon.172 Exxon agreed to pay $900 million to the 
state of Alaska and the U.S. government in damages, and in return it was 
released from any related liability, including all private claims for natural 
resource damages.173 A district court dismissed the sport fishermen’s class 
action, holding that their claims were precluded by Alaska’s parens 
patriae action.174 The Ninth Circuit affirmed.175 
Alaska Sport Fishing proved problematic because the quasi-sovereign 
interests claimed by the state of Alaska—namely, use and enjoyment of 
natural resources—overlapped with the particularized interests of a class 
of individuals. Had the state not brought its parens patriae suit, the sport 
fishermen’s suit may have advanced as a full-fledged class action, 
potentially providing class members with some form of damages. 
Alternatively, their suit may have been dismissed later on other grounds. 
Still, the sport fishermen were not given the opportunity to progress with 
their claims as a direct result of the state’s parens patriae settlement. 
Instead, the state of Alaska essentially assumed representation of the sport 
fishermen along with all other Alaskan citizens who were impacted by the 
natural resource damages. The parens patriae suit was not burdened by 
Rule 23 obstacles and had the clout of the government behind it, leading 
Exxon to quickly settle with the state and preclude any related private 
claims. 
                                                     
168. Amended Complaint, In re Exxon Valdez, 1993 WL 735037 (D. Alaska) (No. 3284); see also 
Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 771 (9th Cir. 1994). 
169. Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n, 34 F.3d at 771. 
170. Alaska v. Exxon Corp., No. A91-083 (D. Alaska 1991). 
171. Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n, 34 F.3d at 771. 
172. Id.; Lemos, supra note 43. 
173. Id. 
174. In re Exxon Valdez, 1993 WL 735037 (D. Alaska). 
175. Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n, 34 F.3d at 774. 
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The Alaska Sport Fishing case represents a poignant example of parens 
patriae preclusion. But because parens patriae suits have yet to seriously 
impinge on due process rights with any frequency, courts have yet to 
seriously analyze the best way to regulate parens patriae claims and deal 
with res judicata effects. Notably, some courts are uneasy regarding the 
notion that parens patriae suits can potentially recover money damages 
for injuries suffered by individuals that might otherwise be recovered 
independently from the state’s action.176 This uncertainty stems, 
ultimately, from the loosely-defined scope of quasi-sovereign interests 
and courts’ confusion surrounding the distinction between state interests 
and citizen interests. “‘Quasi-sovereign’ is one of those loopy concepts 
that comes along often enough to remind us that appellate courts 
sometimes lose their moorings and drift off into the ether. It is a 
meaningless term absolutely bereft of utility.”177 This historical tendency 
to avoid clear and precise boundaries as to what constitutes quasi-
sovereign interests has created a record of inadequate common law for 
courts to rely on in deciding whether to permit parens patriae standing. 
Indeed, “[t]here is clearly tension, if not outright inconsistency, among 
some of the cases allowing and disallowing individual relief in parens 
patriae suits.”178 
IV. FOUR APPROACHES TO AVOID UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
PRECLUSION 
As discussed above, parens patriae suits may not always protect the 
interests of individuals who have been harmed. While private class actions 
also raise concerns regarding adequacy of representation and fairness of 
settlements, their many procedural safeguards help to diminish those 
concerns. When state attorneys general bring parens patriae claims that 
overlap private claims of individuals, they potentially deprive individuals 
of their due process and often bring about unfair settlements that ignore 
those who have in fact been harmed. 
There are at least four ways that courts could resolve these concerns. 
Professor Margaret H. Lemos has provided the first two suggestions.179 
                                                     
176. See, e.g., California v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 474 F.2d 774, 777 (9th Cir. 1973) (“[I]n our judgment 
[the state’s use of parens patriae to provide injured citizens with the best possible recovery] is not the 
type of state action taken to afford the sort of benefit that the common-law concept of parens patriae 
contemplates.”). 
177. Ratliff, supra note 40, at 1851. 
178. Thomas, supra note 41, at 794 n.252 (quoting Jim Ryan & Don R. Sampen, Suing on Behalf 
of the State: A Parens Patriae Primer, 86 ILL. B.J. 684, 687 (1998)). 
179. See generally Lemos, supra note 43, at 542–48.  
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The first option calls for heightened procedural requirements for parens 
patriae and other state actions.180 The second option calls for a limit on 
the preclusive effects of parens patriae suits.181 Both of these options 
provide valuable remedial effects to the concerns of parens patriae 
preclusion, but they also pose certain challenges—practically, in their 
implementation, and consequentially, in what they can accomplish. 
Accordingly, this Comment proposes two additional methods for avoiding 
parens patriae preclusion. First, courts could consolidate parens patriae 
suits and private class actions, at least for purposes of discovery and 
liability. Doing so would improve both the fairness and the efficiency of 
litigation and settlement. Alternatively, Congress could modify the Anti-
Injunction Act (AIA) to allow private citizens with claims, either 
individually or through class representation, to stay a concurrent parens 
patriae suit that would otherwise preclude their claims. None of these 
options provides a clear or obvious solution. Each poses various 
challenges or leaves due process gaps that may require yet another 
solution. Still, as Professor Lemos aptly noted, “[t]he goal here is not to 
develop a comprehensive procedural ‘fix’ for the problems with parens 
patriae preclusion, but to shine some light on possible paths forward.”182 
None of these four approaches requires exclusivity, and it may be the case 
that they are best adopted, ironically, in the aggregate. 
A. Heightened Procedural Requirements: Class Action Rules for 
Parens Patriae Suits 
Perhaps the most intuitive response to the problems with parens patriae 
suits is to require them to comply with some of the procedural 
requirements governing damages class actions.183 This raises two primary 
considerations. First, should procedural requirements be applied to all 
parens patriae suits as a matter of law, or should they be applied strictly 
to parens patriae actions that run the risk of infringing on due process 
rights? Second, which procedural requirements should apply? 
As Professor Lemos points out, procedural requirements might apply 
only when such parens patriae suits threaten to preclude individual 
damages claims.184 However, this creates a dilemma in that a court must 
                                                     
180. Id. at 542. 
181. Id. 
182. Id.  
183. See id. 
184. Id. (“One way to address the formal and functional problems with parens patriae actions 
would be to subject such suits to some of the procedural requirements that govern damages class 
actions — at least when those suits seek to terminate individual claims for damages or other monetary 
relief.” (emphasis added)). 
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apply particular procedural requirements case-by-case. Furthermore, 
before procedural requirements could be applied, a court must first 
determine that shared claims actually exist between the parens patriae 
suit within the court’s jurisdiction, and other private actions under the 
jurisdiction of a separate federal court. This Comment proposes that such 
procedural requirements, if applied at all, should apply to parens patriae 
suits generally, and not on a case-by-case basis. Doing so would provide 
some added assurance of adequacy of representation without requiring 
judges to make arduous and time-consuming analyses of other cases in 
other courts’ jurisdictions. 
On the other hand, all the rules and requirements governing damages 
class actions need not be applied to parens patriae actions. Indeed, such 
rigidity would be both undesirable as well as impracticable. Requiring 
adequate representation and notice may be a feasible and beneficial 
starting point. While the historical origins of the doctrine of parens 
patriae give state attorneys general somewhat of a façade of constitutional 
adequacy,185 courts could actually inquire into the competency of state 
attorneys general in much the same way they assiduously inspect class 
action counsel. Courts might consider, for example, “whether the attorney 
general has both the resources and the incentives to pursue the relevant 
claims vigorously.”186 Professor Lemos notes that such an inquiry could 
occur within the state case187 or in a later private action brought by the 
parens patriae members. The gist of the change would be to depart from 
the centuries-old assumption that the public nature of the parens patriae 
makes the attorney general an “adequate representation of a subgroup of 
citizens in an adjudicative context.”188 
                                                     
185. See supra notes 151–52. 
186. Lemos, supra note 43, at 543 n.255 (citing Jay Tidmarsh, Rethinking Adequacy of 
Representation, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1151 (2009) (explaining that adequate representation in class 
actions protects against “incompetence” and “indifference” of class counsel and class 
representatives)). Naturally, because there are no class representatives in parens patriae actions, no 
inquiry into their adequacy would be warranted. 
187. Numerous state and federal statutes require courts to approve parens patriae settlements. In 
general, an inquiry into whether the settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate” could include an 
inspection of the attorney general. See Lemos, supra note 43, at 543 n.256 (citing New York v. 
Nintendo of Am., Inc., 775 F. Supp. 676, 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“While the [federal antitrust] statute 
does not state the standard to use in approving a parens patriae settlement, courts have adopted the 
standard used in class actions.”); In re Mid-Atl. Toyota Antitrust Litig., 564 F. Supp. 1379, 1383 (D. 
Md. 1983) (“Similar standards should govern judicial review of proposed settlements in both parens 
patriae actions and private class actions.”)). 
188. Lemos, supra note 43, at 543. Lemos further notes that courts “should [not] categorically limit 
the state’s parens patriae authority to cases in which private class actions are unavailable or 
unfeasible,” and should instead assess the adequacy of private class actions versus parens patriae 
suits on a “case-by-case basis rather than adopting an across-the-board preference for either model.” 
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Professor Lemos notes that expecting courts to conduct inquiries into 
the adequacy of parens patriae representation “puts [them] in the 
unenviable position of second-guessing the attorney general’s choices 
with respect to policy tradeoffs and other matters in which judges are 
unlikely to be expert.”189 Furthermore, what constitutes adequate 
representation even in class actions is unclear, which places a substantial 
burden on courts to distinguish “possible conflicts between public and 
private interests” as well as to determine “whether the attorney general is 
capable of effectively representing the interests of the parens patriae 
group members.”190 In general, courts have shied away from questioning 
the adequacy of public representation.191 
Additionally, as discussed above, members of parens patriae groups 
are deprived of due process if they are not given notice of the suit 
representing them, or if they are not given an opportunity to opt out of 
such suit to avoid preclusion.192 Scholars have debated the costs and 
benefits of requiring notice and opt out procedures even in the class action 
field.193 Actions with relatively small claims and a large potential class of 
plaintiffs, for example, may incur costs that are greater than the expected 
recovery and provide notice for little gain. On the other hand: 
In cases where the individual claims are relatively large, so that 
concerns about fairness to individual claimants have real bite, 
                                                     
Id. at 543 n.257. Although I agree with the general principle that both private damages class actions 
and parens patriae actions are discretely valuable tools of aggregation, it does not follow that there 
should be no preference for one or the other. As discussed below, parens patriae actions may be most 
effective when they take a subsidiary, or at least secondary, role to private class actions. In this way, 
parens patriae returns to its purposive roots as an option either for cases in which class actions are 
unavailable or unfeasible, or simply after their preclusive effect can be avoided.  
189. Id. at 543. 
190. Id. at 544. 
191. See, e.g., Sam Fox Publ’g Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683, 689 (1961) (“Apart from 
anything else, sound policy would strongly lead us to decline [the] invitation to assess the wisdom of 
the Government’s judgment in negotiating and accepting [a] consent decree, at least in the absence of 
any claim of bad faith or malfeasance on the part of the Government in so acting.”); Friends of 
Milwaukee’s Rivers v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 382 F.3d 743, 760 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(“[D]iligence on the part of the State is presumed. . . . [C]ourts are not in the business of designing, 
constructing or maintaining sewage treatment systems.”). 
192. See Lemos, supra note 43, 544–45, 545 n.265 (noting that “[s]ome statutes create rights to opt 
out of parens patriae actions, but coverage is spotty”).  
193. Compare, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in 
Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1, 27–28 (1991) (arguing that the benefits of notice in large-scale, small-claims class 
actions “appear minimal at best” while the costs “can be substantial,” and concluding that “notice has 
little realistic value to class members” in such cases), with Patrick Woolley, Rethinking the Adequacy 
of Adequate Representation, 75 TEX. L. REV. 571, 573–76 (1997) (emphasizing notice as a 
prerequisite to the right to be heard). 
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notice and opt-out rights can provide important protection for 
individuals who would prefer to sue separately, or who wish to 
keep a close eye on the conduct of the aggregate litigation before 
deciding whether to join in the judgment.194 
In these instances, it seems that due process requires both notice and an 
opportunity to opt out. Thus, courts must either require notice and an 
opportunity to opt out in every parens patriae case (as is the requirement 
under Rule 23 for damages class actions) or pursue a cost-benefit analysis 
of notice and opt-out rights in each individual parens patriae case.195 Both 
options pose problems. The first is over-inclusive and costly; the second 
places a time-consuming and difficult burden on courts.196 
Furthermore, parens patriae suits might be especially relevant when an 
attorney general represents citizens who may, for various reasons, be 
unable to meet the requirements of Rule 23.197 In that case, adding class-
action style requirements would further obstruct individuals seeking relief 
and relinquish an alternative method of litigation.198 Subjecting parens 
patriae suits to class action-style procedural requirements is compelling 
because parens patriae suits and class actions are, in a sense, procedural 
siblings. However, such a solution may be contrary to the historical 
purpose of parens patriae. First, allowing citizens to opt-out of a parens 
patriae suit would defeat the purpose of the state acting on behalf of its 
citizens. If individuals have the choice to opt-out, the state is actually 
acting on behalf of only some injured citizens, which makes parens 
patriae hardly distinguishable from private class actions. 
Second, if citizens are given the option to opt-out, the assumption is 
that some will or will want to. This suggests that either the representation 
by the state attorney general is inadequate, or that harmed citizens would 
prefer to not be bound by the outcome, presumably because they intend to 
litigate individually or in a class capacity. This, too, cuts at the heart of 
parens patriae, wherein the state assumes the role of “parent” to its 
citizens who purportedly cannot act legally on their own behalf. If citizens 
can act on their own behalf, and perhaps are better represented that way, 
parens patriae power has seemingly overstepped its authority. 
                                                     
194. Lemos, supra note 43, at 545. 
195. Id.  
196. Id.  
197. 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-20, 454 (3d ed. 2000); HIMES, 
supra note 88, at 9. 
198.  TRIBE, supra note 197, at 454. 
10 - Hanna.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/18/2017  9:06 AM 
2017] MISUSE OF PARENS PATRIAE  1985 
 
B. Limiting Parens Patriae Preclusion 
Professor Lemos proposes an alternative “no-preclusion” solution to 
avoid due process violations.199 Such an approach requires courts to 
“hold[] that state suits cannot preclude private actions for damages 
(whether individual or aggregate).”200 In important ways, this approach is 
simpler and preferable to the application of procedural requirements 
because it preserves the differences between public and private aggregate 
litigation.201 This approach solves the problem of preclusion without 
posing the challenges of procedural processes, and indeed, neither notice 
nor opt-out rights would be required with this approach. 
Still, defendants may be concerned that plaintiffs will be given the 
opportunity to “double-dip” by recovering twice for the same claim—
once through parens patriae and once through private litigation.202 Lemos 
proposes two solutions. First, courts could “adopt what is effectively an 
opt-in regime, under which any individuals who accept funds through a 
state suit relinquish their right to pursue private remedies.”203 However, 
this solution would once again require costly notice procedures or would 
rely on injured individuals to have the knowledge and resources to 
understand the costs and benefits of opting in. 
Alternatively, Lemos suggests that courts “deduct any payments made 
in a state suit from the recovery in a subsequent private class action.”204 
Still, settlement funds resulting from parens patriae suits are rarely 
distributed in whole to injured individuals,205 and often injured citizens 
receive no monetary value at all.206 So, unless unclaimed funds must 
return to the defendant, “a judicial policy against allowing the same 
claimant to recover twice from the same defendant will not protect the 
                                                     
199. Lemos, supra note 43, at 546. 
200. Id.  
201. Id.  
202. Id. at 546–48. 
203. Id. at 547 & n.270 (emphasis added) (citing Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 
333 (1980) (“[W]here the EEOC has prevailed in its action, the court may reasonably require any 
individual who claims under its judgment to relinquish his right to bring a separate private action.”)). 
204. Id. at 547. 
205. See Stephen Calkins, An Enforcement Official’s Reflections on Antitrust Class Actions, 39 
ARIZ. L. REV. 413, 436 (1997) (noting that approximately 70,000 out of 340,000 eligible individuals 
received refund checks in a multistate antitrust settlement (citing In re Minolta Camera Prods. 
Antitrust Litig., 668 F. Supp. 456 (D. Md. 1987))). 
206. See Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 771 (9th Cir. 1994). 
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defendant from paying twice for the same harm.”207 Thus, a “focus on 
preventing double recoveries” leaves the defendant with “no protection 
against subsequent private suits,” while a “focus . . . on preventing double 
payments for the same harms,” results in individuals “being bound by a 
judgment from which they gained little or nothing at all.”208 
While both options—adding class action procedural requirements to 
parens patriae or asking courts to forbid parens patriae preclusion of 
private damages claims—provide valuable protections against 
constitutional violations, they also pose certain challenges. This Comment 
suggests two additional paths that may help to avoid these challenges, 
though they, too, are not without flaws. These two proposals should be 
considered both in light of the solutions posed by Lemos, and in 
conjunction with each other. 
C. Joinder of Private and Public Actions Would Increase Efficiency 
in Hearing Complex Actions and Help Prevent Unconstitutional 
Preclusion 
This Comment’s first proposal would allow for joinder of private class 
actions and state parens patriae suits. A similar consolidation approach 
has been suggested in the mass tort context for concurrent class actions 
and individual actions in state and federal courts.209 The purpose of 
consolidating concurrent lawsuits is, essentially, to avoid “expense, delay, 
resulting crowding of dockets, divergent decisions on identical factual 
questions, and sometimes the insolvency of the defendants who are being 
sued.”210 As it stands, the law imposes no procedural requirement that 
lawyers consolidate the often tens of thousands of related lawsuits filed in 
federal and state courts throughout the country.211 
                                                     
207. Lemos, supra note 43, at 547 (noting that “[t]he problem is exacerbated in cases involving cy 
pres distributions, where none of the individuals represented by the attorney general actually recovers 
funds”). 
208. Id.  
209. See generally Tanya Pierce, It’s Not Over ‘Til It’s Over: Mandating Federal Pretrial 
Jurisdiction and Oversight in Mass Torts, 79 MO. L. REV. 27 (2014). 
210. William H. Rehnquist, Welcoming Remarks: National Mass Tort Conference, 73 TEX. L. REV. 
1523, 1524 (1995). 
211. See, e.g., In re Motor Fuel Temperature Sales Practices Litig., 711 F.3d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 
2013) (noting the overburdened district judges but rejecting multidistrict litigation judge’s offer to act 
as a visiting judge in the district where some of the cases had been transferred and where they would 
return); U.S. JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., MDL STATISTICS REPORT – DISTRIBUTION 
OF PENDING MDL DOCKETS 1–5 (2013), http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/Pending 
_MDL-Dockets_By_District-August-15-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/49BT-XURT] (showing 1,531 
actions currently pending related to Chantix, 2,917 actions currently pending related to Prempro, 
9,868 actions currently pending related to Yasmin and Yaz, 2,854 actions currently pending related 
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Allowing consolidation of state parens patriae actions and private 
damages class actions when there are shared claims would allow courts to 
avoid these same efficiency concerns in several ways. First, doing so 
would decrease duplicative litigation during discovery, witness and expert 
testimonies, and determination of liability. Consolidated cases would 
likely be separated during the damages phase. Second, consolidation 
would lighten the judicial load by streamlining related cases. Third, judges 
could better assess the relevant injuries, liabilities, and causation with all 
the facts and claims on the same table. Finally, and most importantly for 
this Comment, consolidation would help prevent parens patriae suits 
from precluding at least those individual claims brought by private parties 
before judgment is entered on the parens patriae suit.212 This advantage, 
however, is limited. Only private claims brought prior to issuance of final 
judgment of a parens patriae suit would be protected from preclusion by 
consolidation. Still, at least some private claims would avoid parens 
patriae preclusion if they were compelled to consolidate with a concurrent 
parens patriae suit. 
In joining parens patriae and private class actions, courts could ensure 
that the claims of injured individuals are addressed at the same time as the 
quasi-public injuries claimed by the state. Such consolidation would 
ensure that state governments do not receive more than their fair share—
namely, that any recovery the state receives does not infringe upon the 
recoveries of injured individuals and injured classes. As it currently 
stands, parens patriae claims are often able to attain final judgment or 
settlement before class actions simply because they are unburdened by the 
procedural requirements of Rule 23 and, in particular, the high hurdle of 
obtaining class certification.213 If courts were required to consolidate 
parens patriae with all related class actions, it would ensure that 
                                                     
to the Deepwater Horizon spill, 2,514 actions currently pending related to the Actos Products liability 
litigation, 1,279 actions currently pending related to NuvaRing, 3,531 actions currently pending 
related to Asbestos, and over 25,900 actions currently pending related to various pelvic repair 
products). 
212. Private parties with claims who fail to initiate actions prior to the parens patriae action 
reaching judgment would inevitably be precluded despite allowing joinder, as would private parties 
with claims that arise after judgment is reached. 
213. See, e.g., Edward Brunet, Improving Class Action Efficiency by Expanding Use of Parens 
Patriae Suits and Intervention, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1919, 1938 (2000) (noting the effectiveness of parens 
patriae suits “particularly because of the ease or comparatively low transaction costs associated with 
initiating such . . . suit[s]”); Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in 
the Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 660 (2012) (arguing that parens 
patriae suits should “fill the void left by class actions” because “[p]arens patriae suits are not subject 
to Rule 23 or contractual waiver provisions, and so avoid the majority of impediments to 
contemporary class actions”). 
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individuals are not precluded merely because the state beat them to the 
finish line. 
Consolidation would also serve to protect the rights of defendants. 
Claimants would be aggregated in a single forum, reducing duplicative 
and wasteful expenses on defending the same claims in countless states 
and districts. More importantly, consolidation would prevent plaintiffs 
from recovering twice for the same injury, and likewise, would protect 
defendants from being unjustly subjected to a kind of “double jeopardy.” 
Consolidation may push parens patriae into more of a back-seat role 
in aggregate litigation. However, this would, in many cases, benefit 
injured citizens by ensuring that their claims are being vigorously 
represented under the protection of due process and without the threat of 
preclusion by the state. Courts could better distinguish between a state’s 
quasi-sovereign interests and the private interests of individuals, which 
may decrease the state’s damages but would almost certainly increase the 
recovery going directly into the hands of injured citizens. Such a process 
is in line with the original purpose of parens patriae—to protect the state’s 
citizens when they cannot bring claims, rather than to appropriate 
individual claims as state claims at the citizens’ expense. 
D. Allowing Private Parties to Stay Parens Patriae Suits 
Alternatively, courts could allow private parties to request an 
injunction staying a concurrent parens patriae suit until individual and 
class claims have been settled to avoid preclusion. The benefits of such a 
procedural mechanism would be extensive. First, it would ensure that only 
parens patriae suits with a genuine threat of precluding individual claims 
would be affected, leaving most parens patriae suits (including those 
premised on sovereign interests) free from restriction and with a flexibility 
that makes them distinctly useful aggregate tools. Second, it would put 
the onus on injured individuals or classes, under the representation and 
advisement of counsel, to protect their interests. This is useful because 
individuals are in the best position to know of their own injuries and are 
most likely to vigorously call for their own protection. It would also not 
require courts to adopt a piece-meal and extensive inquiry into whether 
and to what extent individual rights are being precluded. Furthermore, the 
public and publicized nature of parens patriae suits suggests that 
individuals with related harms would be able to access the information 
they need to prove preclusive effects with relative ease. 
The problem with this approach is that it requires Congress to make an 
exception to the general rule that federal courts cannot enjoin state 
proceedings. The AIA states that “a court of the United States may not 
grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly 
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authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its 
jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.”214 The AIA’s effect 
is to prohibit federal courts from issuing injunctions against state courts, 
with the three explicit exceptions,215 as well as to prevent fraudulently 
obtained judgments from being enforced.216 For the purposes of this 
section, one exception is found in the language, “expressly authorized by 
Act of Congress,” wherein Congress could permit federal courts to issue 
injunctions against state courts in limited circumstances.217 
This approach would require Congress to permit federal courts to issue 
injunctions on state court proceedings, for the limited purpose of staying 
a parens patriae suit when private parties can show that the state action 
would preclude their individual claims in violation of due process. Such a 
proposal admittedly faces an uphill battle. Even in the somewhat unlikely 
chance that Congress made an exception for a parens patriae injunction, 
other questions regarding the consistency of such an injunction with the 
principles of equity, comity, and federalism would ensue.218 
CONCLUSION 
Early applications of parens patriae in U.S. jurisprudence were modest 
and strictly limited in scope. In a relatively short time, the doctrine was 
expanded to remedy environmental, antitrust, healthcare, and consumer 
protection injuries, to name just a few. The scope and breadth of parens 
patriae authority has exploded from a protective shield of last resort to a 
proactive sword wielded exclusively by the state. The murky history and 
development of parens patriae in the U.S. has resulted in a somewhat 
lackluster body of common law for courts to draw upon to delineate and 
define the scope of quasi-sovereign rights in particular, and parens patriae 
in general. 
Parens patriae undoubtedly has the potential to play a unique and 
valuable role in aggregate litigation. Still, despite the fact that parens 
patriae suits and private class actions raise similar concerns about fairness 
to individuals, the two types of representative, aggregate litigation are 
treated entirely differently, largely because of the assumption that state 
attorneys general will always adequately represent the interests of state 
citizens. As courts grapple with these due process issues posed by parens 
patriae suits, they will likely need to provide a clearer definition of quasi-
                                                     
214. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2012). 
215. See Atl. Coast Line R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281 (1970). 
216. See Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220 (1957). 
217. 28 U.S.C. § 2283. 
218. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 226 (1972); Pierce, supra note 209, at 45. 
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sovereign interests. Furthermore, courts should consider closing the 
procedural gap between parens patriae suits and private class actions by 
applying procedural requirements to parens patriae suits, perhaps 
modeled off Rule 23 requirements. But while heightened procedural 
requirements may serve to increase the protection of individuals’ due 
process rights, they may also cripple parens patriae power in such a way 
that makes it indistinguishable from damages class actions, and thereby 
rendering it obsolete. Courts instead, or in addition, could revise 
preclusion law to prevent public suits from precluding private claims. 
Such a solution would be cleaner and more effective, but it likely requires 
more from courts and is therefore less likely to materialize. Alternatively, 
courts could require the consolidation of related private claims and parens 
patriae suits to avoid such preclusive effects. This option has the added 
benefit of increasing judicial expediency and preserving judicial and 
discovery resources, but it, too, places a burden on courts. Finally, 
Congress could make an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act to allow 
private parties to stay parens patriae claims. This option may hold the 
most potential of all and would likely be the simplest solution for courts, 
but it would require Congress to make a highly unlikely exception with 
potentially broad consequences beyond the scope of parens patriae 
claims. 
While efforts to avoid due process violations resulting from public 
preclusion of private claims may in turn leave fewer claims available for 
state attorneys general, such an effect might be welcomed by the 
individuals parens patriae is intended to benefit. Indeed, creating 
speedbumps for parens patriae actions ultimately returns parens patriae 
to its roots—as a protective last resort for bringing relief to those who 
could not otherwise seek relief on their own behalf. 
 
